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1 Guangdong province, and the Pearl River Delta in particular, are the areas that have
experienced the highest rate of industrialisation in China since the launch of the reform
policy in 1978. Up to the end of the 1990s, a considerable number of private enterprises—
but under a wide range of forms of ownership—were created through local initiative. The
region thus experienced a two-fold process: the creation of small enterprises specialising in
often traditional industrial production, and the formation of specialised production zones.
From 1999, the provincial government sought to stimulate the improvement of production
techniques and of basic technologies in the region. This public initiative coincided with a
private dynamic and contributed to raising the level of industrial performance in the Delta.
The question is whether the region will manage to make the technological transformation
which is essential to the future competitiveness of its industry. The transformation of even a
high-performance industrial area into a system of innovation, where governments, universities
and enterprises interact in a permanent fashion in order to innovate and create a region on
the cutting edge of progress, remains a difficult objective to achieve. It seems that the local
authorities, rather than having an innovation policy—which is to say taking measures which
would make it possible to structure interactions—, have sought to support enterprises or groups
of enterprises on a one-off basis, through a succession of experiments.
2 While the region lacks universities of renown and research centres of national standing,
investments by enterprises in Research and Development (R&D) are higher there than in the
other Chinese provinces. This characteristic, which is close to the situation experienced by
Singapore in the early 1980s1, has been the starting point of this research. After setting out
the development of industrial and technology policy in Guangdong at the end of the 1990s,
we will concentrate on a study of the role of enterprises in R&D and on an analysis of the
effects that the policies of specialised industrial zones, aimed at developing applied research
and innovation, can have on the emergence of a system of innovation.
3 This article is based on a report drawn up by a team of researchers and professors under the
authority of the Office of Science and Technology of Guangdong province, which we will
henceforth refer to as the "Blue Report", after the colour of its cover2. This is the only report
available that brings together all the data at provincial level. Our analysis of the report is
guided by the specialised literature on the question, and by interviews with local authorities
and enterprises carried out by the team from the Franco-Chinese Centre for the Sociology of
Industry and Technology, in collaboration with the Institute for Research and Development of
Guangdong University (Sun Yat-sen University in Guangzhou), between 2000 and 20043.
Industry and innovation policy
4 In May 1998, the Communist Party (CP) of Guangdong province took a decision to
promote scientific and technological progress, to modernise industrial facilities and "to make
enterprises the source of innovation". Shortly afterwards came the publication of Report No.
16 entitled "On the decision to rely on scientific and technological progress to attain a higher
level of production in Guangdong"4. The same year, the Guangdong provincial authorities
committed themselves to the development of science teaching and to setting up a system of
innovation, "which is to say to favour the grouping of enterprises, to attract foreign investment
and multinationals and to create a productive environment, particularly in the technology belt
of the Pearl River Delta"5. This definition of the system of innovation is closer to that of an
efficient production system—a group of enterprises which are in competition or linked by
commercial ties from suppliers to customers—than to a system of innovation, which is a set
of interactions between the educational, scientific, technological and economic systems6. In
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Guangdong there is a lack of both the scientific component and innovation proper, which is to
say the introduction of new products and processes in enterprises.
5 1999 marked a turning point in China, with the approval of a national policy for stimulating
the industrial and technological development of Chinese enterprises. Innovation became
the buzzword. The novelty lay in the recognition given by the authorities to collective
technology enterprises7 in the widest sense, designated as bearers of technological progress.
For ideological reasons, the central authorities could not promote private enterprises in the
early days of reform, whence the emergence of this category of enterprises, situated between
the enterprises of the centralised economy and those of the free market. They were able to
develop in Beijing by the 1980s, and above all during the 1990s, with the creation in 1991
of the high technology development zone of Zhongguancun. In 1999, concrete measures to
promote high technology were decreed in order to solve the crucial problem of lack of internal
resources, including subsidies, tax reductions for R&D spending, tax exemptions on revenue
derived from the transfer or development of new technology, a preferential Value Added
Tax (VAT) rate of 6% for any software produced and developed in China, a total exemption
from VAT, and subsidies for any exports of high technology. This evolution was particularly
noticeable in Guangdong, since it was at that time that the local authorities realised that the
development model fuelled by foreign direct investment (FDI) was not sufficient to improve
the intrinsic capabilities of local enterprises. Beginning in 1998, Guangdong began to reform
its system of scientific research, by integrating enterprises more closely and committing them
to setting up R&D centres. In early 2000, the province decreed measures of technological
support for enterprises, with the policy of "industrial clusters".
6 Reform of the national research system began in the mid-1980s8. After initial restructuring,
in particular of the relations between the technology centres of the large enterprises and their
state supervisors, the major policy of the central government was to reduce the funds allocated
to public research institutions. Research institutes and centres had to find non-governmental
financing9. The positive consequences have been a better fit between research and the needs of
the market, and a diversification of the areas of research. Moreover, some Chinese enterprises
have developed in-house R&D units. However, this way of integrating enterprises into the
system "from below", has led, for research institutions, to an increase in small-scale, short-
term projects, with smaller budgets, and generally to a levelling-off of progress in research,
since overall, enterprises have not been involved in defining or initiating government research
programmes. Moreover, the national policy which consists in eliminating or privatising a very
high number of research centres of national standing is also called into question by some
observers, who, like Cao Cong or Adam Segal, have noted rigid separations between the
world of the university and that of enterprise10. The task is enormous since it is a matter of
reforming the Academy of Sciences (reducing the number of centres and of personnel, who
have been cut by more than 20,000), changing 1,618 public research institutes into enterprises
(a reform which is well under way, since among the technological development centres which
were dependent on provincial and municipal governments, some 70% have been registered as
enterprises). Some 205 institutes which depended on various ministries (Agriculture, Territory
and Resources, Water Resources, the Bureau of Forests and the Weather Bureau) have also
been transformed11.
The growth of Guangdong's research and technology
system
7 Economic analyses of Guangdong province usually concentrate on the creation of enterprises
and on foreign investment. These were indeed the real engines of development which were
superimposed—that is the right word—on the old socialist production structure12. Guangdong
is at present the richest province in China, since it receives over one-third of FDI in China,
and its exports of high technology account for 35% of China’s total.
8 The relative paucity of state enterprises13, the lack of heavy processing industries (basic
chemicals and steel) and the relative political autonomy enjoyed by the province in Deng
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Xiaoping's time, as well as the proximity of Hong Kong and Macau, gave the province a
decisive advantage. However, as the Blue Report shows, these advantages for the development
of light assembly industry became handicaps when it came to raising technological capacity14.
Neither Hong Kong nor foreign enterprises really invested in high technology. The main
problem is that FDI cannot substitute for the development of internal technological capacity,
because foreign companies only transfer high value added activities if they are sure to find
raw materials and equipment in large quantities.
9 "In Guangdong, total investment in R&D was 1.942 billion yuan and 2.870 billion yuan in
1996 and 1997, or 0.3% and 0.39% of the province's GDP"15. In 2000, investment exceeded
10 billion yuan (US$1.2 billion) amounting to 1.11% of GDP—a little less than Beijing (over
15 billion yuan of R&D spending) but more than Shanghai (7.4 billion yuan) [figures from
October 2001]. However, in percentage of GDP, Guangdong is in third place, behind Shanghai,
an indication of the relatively low level of its research investment.
1.Research and Development (R&D) Spending in 2001
10 Generally speaking—and this is surprising—the report states that the financing of research
institutions is declining. Now, during the 1990s, the central government's spending on basic
research, both applied and experimental, remained stable. In 2000, national R&D spending
was 89 billion yuan, an increase of 18% over the previous year, reaching 1% of GDP. Only 7%
of total spending was then allocated to basic research (figures from the Ministry of Science and
Technology, but only 5.2% according to the Blue Report). Despite an improved sharing out
of resources, the benefits of investments were uncertain16. The World Bank report17 explained
this apparent contradiction between the increase—for over ten years—in the share of R&D
in relation to GDP, and the decline in resources of the research institutions, by the increase
in costs and by the lack of transparency in allocations. In reality, it does seem that the recent
period has seen a massive reorientation of public spending towards less centralised facilities,
which are more dependent on local authorities and carry out much more finalised work.
Their reorientation was accompanied by the dismantling of central research centres that were
supposed to be carrying out finalised research. The finding of the authorities in 2002 was
that "a number of questions have not yet been resolved, such as that of the modernisation of
equipment"18. In China, the central government remains the principal source of financing for
R&D, but, as the Blue Report points out, "this funding is too low to allow research facilities
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to engage in sizeable long-term projects: facilities coexist without any selection and lack their
own initiative"19.
2. Scientists and Engineers as a Proportion of the Population in 2000
11 Guangdong enjoys the benefit of a fairly well-trained technical work force: of the province's
total population, 238 out of every 10,000 have a qualification in a technical specialisation
and 1,886 employees out of every 10,000 have a technical specialisation. In terms of this
indicator, Guangdong is in second place at the national level20. But the province has a major
weakness in terms of high-level cadre training and lacks scientists and engineers. The average
level of education is below the national average, whether in terms of young people attending
university or in terms of the quality of the teachers. What the Blue Report hints at, and which
is also confirmed orally by various leaders, is that the high average technical level of the
province is due to the immigration of young graduates from other Chinese provinces, attracted
by the employment possibilities. Training is a paramount objective for the next few years.
For example the universities have set up adult training systems on Saturdays and Sundays,
mainly in management (in the form of MBAs or EMBAs). This market has become extremely
competitive, particularly in Shenzhen. In this city are to be found training programmes from
several universities, from Guangzhou and other cities (particularly Beijing). Companies pay
for these training programmes, which are often very expensive, for their cadres for at least three
reasons: they acquire a vocabulary and management models which correspond to international
models, they can build networks of personal relations with cadres from other enterprises, and
finally these courses are a token of prestige for enterprises which then advertise the high level
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of training of their cadres—an important criterion of the enterprise's reputation in the eyes of
the authorities, competitors, customers and suppliers.
Enterprise investment in R&D
12 In China enterprises invest little in R&D: the share of their investment has even declined.
Large and medium enterprises invested 1.39% of their income in R&D in 1991, 1.15% in
1995, 1.35% in 1999, and 1.6% in 2001. Guangdong, according to the Blue Report, shows
better results in terms of enterprise investment than the other Chinese provinces21. Enterprise
investment amounted to 88% of overall investment in 2000 (9.520 million yuan) and 90% in
2001 (11.370 million yuan).
3. Resources and Spending in Science and Technology of the Principal Municipalities of Guangdong
13 At the beginning of 2001, there were 2,733 "technological and scientific research facilities",
employing 95,400 scientists and technicians, about double the figure in 1995. It is the city of
Shenzhen which has carried this development the most: in 2001, it had 521 R&D facilities,
of which 91.7% were set up by enterprises. In 2001, 26 development centres of the most
productive enterprises had developed 459 new products, and 440 patent registrations, of which
161 were for inventions. Their investment in research had reached the sum of 4.220 billion
yuan, or 6.62% of their total revenue (over 10% for Huawei and Zhongxing (ZTE), leading
electronics enterprises)22. In 2001, 65,000 patents were issued in China, and Guangdong
accounted for over half of these registrations. Obviously this reflects the technological
dynamism of the province, but also the scale of foreign investment in the province, for most
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invention patents in China are taken out by foreign enterprises, while Chinese enterprises tend
to register utility models and design23.
4. Patents Registered in Guangdong
14 In the Special Economic Zone of Shenzhen, and to a lesser extent in Zhuhai, the authorities
carried out an offensive to develop the technological capacity of enterprises during the
1990s, but such was not the case in Guangzhou. In Shenzhen, the growth of R&D facilities
in enterprises was carried out on the basis of investment in electronics (both national
enterprises and those with foreign investment) above all, and by basing itself on the collective
technology enterprises' capacity for development. However, according to Adam Segal,
Shenzhen constituted a case apart in the region. The authorities in Guangzhou, in his view, and
those in Guangdong province, according to our own observations, were slow to promulgate
policies to support high technology enterprises. Guangzhou thus faced strong competition from
Shenzhen, which managed to tap into the flow of qualified personnel.
5. Research Organisations in Guangdong
15 In Guangdong, most R&D centres are set up within enterprises, which provide 70% of the
funding and are responsible for 65% of so-called high technology products. In 1998, 23.8% of
major enterprises (including national enterprises, the big groups and enterprises with foreign
capital) had their own R&D centres, in 1999 26.2%, and in 2000 25.7%. In 2001, 85% of small
and medium collective technology enterprises operating in the technical sector had an R&D
centre: of the 25.600 billion yuan invested in science and technology in Guangdong, 71.4%
came from the province's enterprises. Large and medium enterprises invested 9.450 billion
yuan that year, or 4.172 billion yuan more than in 1997. This movement of creation of R&D
centres was not due to a political initiative from the authorities, but rather to the transfer by
certain foreign companies of part of their R&D activity to China, and to particular support for
certain enterprises by their Chinese supervisory authorities. When the Guangdong authorities
recognise the importance of enterprises in the development of a system of innovation, they do
not play a decisive stimulation role, but ratify a largely spontaneous evolution. Thus, when the
deputy mayor of the city of Jiangmen confides during an interview that science and technology
are an essential aspect of economic development, this does not translate into specific measures
for enterprises, but into greater tolerance for motorcycle and washing machine manufacturers,
who are more advanced technologically compared to the other industries in the municipality.
Collective technology and innovation enterprises
16 The term "collective technology enterprise" designates enterprises whose ownership is public,
even though most of them function de facto like private enterprises. The Blue Report defines
them by their orientation to the market and their responsibility for profits and losses24. These
enterprises have been the institutional form of the most dynamic enterprises all over the
country. The major Chinese brands which are well known abroad, such as TCL, Hai'er and
Legend (now LeNovo), are collective technology enterprises which have been privatised to
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varying degrees. The major brands in Guangdong, such as Meidi (Midéa), Galanz, GREE and
Kelon, are in a similar situation. Enterprises such as Jinlin (domestic appliances) and Jinyue
(electronic components), are "privatised" public enterprises, which maintain close contact with
their supervising official bureau. The next few years should see a gradual modification of the
legal status of these enterprises.
17 At the end of the 1990s, the recession in Asia, and in the public enterprises, the progress of
the negotiations for China's accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO), combined
with doubts about the effects of previous policies, led to major changes in relations between
the state and collective enterprises. The Chinese authorities became increasingly preoccupied
with not missing the next wave of technological innovation, particularly in Guangdong, where
enterprises were better known for their copies of major brands than for the creation of new
products. In Guangzhou, the authorities allowed these kinds of enterprises to register in the
category of private enterprises (siying qiye, WWWW), without defining them as separate
entities, with specific organisation and technological and financial needs.
18 In 2001, there were 3,952 collective enterprises (0.99% of enterprises in Guangdong), with a
turnover of over 103 billion yuan, over 8 billion yuan in profits, employing 314,000 people,
paying over 7 billion yuan in taxes, and providing exports worth over US$2 billion. These
enterprises accounted for only 7.25% of production value and only 2% of total exports. In
the two cities where they were most numerous, Shenzhen and Guangzhou, they produced
respectively only 10% and 11% of the value of industrial production. They were generally
small, employed an average of seventy people and had a production value which did not exceed
one million yuan per year. The enterprises which most developed technological innovation
products were those said to have "three sources of capital" (public, private and international)
which we usually call "joint companies"25.
6. Collective Science and Technology Entreprises in Guangdong
19 Despite their low proportion among the total number of enterprises in Guangdong, the
collective enterprises accounted for a little less than 30% of the value of cutting-edge industrial
production, and 88% of their products were "high technology". Table 6 shows an estimate
made by the province's services of the number of high technology collective enterprises. The
number of these collective enterprises increased significantly during 2001. In Guangdong's
ten zones for the special development of cutting-edge technology at national and provincial
level, these enterprises represented about 80% of those in operation. In Shenzhen, in 2001,
they accounted for 22 billion yuan of high technology production.
20 These were also the enterprises which invested the most in R&D. In 1997 their R&D
investments did not exceed 1.5 billion yuan. Between 1997 and 2001, these investments
grew by an average of 60% a year, reaching 5.892 billion yuan in 2000 and 7.150 billion in
2001, over half the investments made in the province that year. In the last few years, (before
2001) these enterprises developed over 3,000 new products, of which 70% are protected
by intellectual property law. In 2001, they deposited 3,514 patents, of which 2,763 were
registered.
The Pearl River Delta or China's "Electronics Valley"
21 Guangdong has been the leading province in electronic products since the early 1990s. In
2000, production of electronic equipment and software reached 300 billion yuan. Guangdong
had 21 of the 100 leading Chinese enterprises in this sector, among which were three of the
ten leading national companies. The Pearl River Delta specialised in the manufacture of these
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appliances26. The authority's aim was to develop this sector further in order to allow the region
to compete with Beijing and Shanghai27.
22 Take-off took place in 1991, with production worth over 18 billion yuan, an increase of 73%
over the previous year. During the eighth Five Year Plan, annual growth in the sector was
about 38% (1991-1995). In 1995, the electronics factories in Shenzhen and Huizhou accounted
for 67% of the province's total production value (sales at Huaqiang, Kangjia, Saige and TCL
exceeded 3 billion yuan in 1995)28.
23 The province's "three industrial pillars", electronics/computers, electrical equipment and
petroleum derivatives, went from 253.334 billion yuan in 1997 to 311 billion in 2001. In 1998,
these three industrial sectors amounted to 37.6% of the province's total industrial production,
and to 45.4% in 2001. The share of electronics and computers rose from 16.4% to 22.2%
during that time.
24 In 1997, sales of Guangdong software brought in only 2.5 billion yuan; in 2001 it was 10
billion yuan for software and 26 billion yuan for systems, around one-third of overall sales
for the whole country. In 2001, over 2,000 enterprises were engaged in development and sales
of software, mainly in Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Zhuhai, and to a lesser extent in Nanhai,
Dongguan and Shunde. However the authors of the report point out that China is lagging
behind India in research and in the training of computer experts. This is why the development
of this sector has been one of the objectives of the tenth Five Year Plan (2001-2006).
25 In this sector, as in all of its production, Guangdong is characterised by a stronger orientation
towards exports than the rest of the country. Exports of so-called "high technology" products in
this region increased by 30% between 1999 and 2001. The so-called high technology sector as
a whole accounted for over 23% of the province's exports in 2001. 2002 showed a continuation
and even an increase in the same trend29.
26 Although the definition of the high technology sector includes many enterprises which are
limited to assembling imported components30, or even produce obsolete equipment (often
by choice, as we saw in our interviews, for there is national demand for inexpensive
equipment), the fact remains that the province turns shows a quite good performance in
comparison with other countries which export electronics. It must however be emphasised
that this push in the electronics industry was first initiated by foreign investment, mainly from
enterprises in Taiwan and Hong Kong. As we shall see, the local authorities initially sought
to attract an increasing number of foreign enterprises to the technology development zones,
and subsequently sought to build up the technology capacity of Chinese SMEs by creating
"industrial clusters". The limitations of these policies are the lack of real future prospects, and
support for the reproduction, rather than the production, of new techniques.
The technology development zones
27 March 1986 saw the launch of the national programme called "863", which sought to develop
cutting-edge scientific research, shortly after the creation, in June 1985, of the Shenzhen
industrial park31. In 1988, the central authorities published the "Torch" programme, which
sought to harness the growth of collective enterprises to the development of scientific parks.
Following this national programme, in 1991 the authorities in Guangdong set up 27 high
technology development zones, of which Zhongshan, Tianhe in Guangzhou, and Shenzhen
were the models32. In 1992 and 1993, it was the turn of Foshan, Huizhou and Zuhai to become
high technology development zones. In 1991, the central authorities accepted the proposal of
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the Guangdong government to create the Delta's high-tech development belt, which aimed at
competing with that of Jiangsu (Suzhou, Wuxi, Changzhou) and that of Shanghai.
7. The Industrial Cluster Policy
28 This voluntarist policy produced results: the boom in production took place around 2000,
with the total production of these special zones rising from 50 billion yuan in 1997 to 180
billion in 2001. Moreover, total production of high technology products rose from 111 billion
yuan in 1997 to 354 billion yuan in 2001, with 132 billion in Shenzhen (46%), 61 billion in
Guangzhou, 47 billion in Foshan, a little over 20 billion each for Dongguan and Huizhou, and
between 12 and 17 billion for Zhuhai, Jiangmen and Zhongshan. Shenzhen and Guangzhou
were designated as spearheads in the development of cutting-edge technology by Guangdong
province in 1998. In these two cities were developed the first cutting-edge industrial zones
in the electronics and computer sectors. In Shenzhen the total value of production in the
special high technology production zones exceeded 63 billion yuan in 2001, 17 times the
value in 1996. Over half of the production was protected by intellectual property law. 98% of
production there was in electronics and computers.
29 The city of Zuhai's innovation policy was to attract multinationals. In 2001, the total value
of the production of these special zones reached 10 billion yuan. In Zhongshan, the special
technology zones produced 26 billion yuan, or a quarter of the city's industrial production and
7 billion more than the previous year.
30 Between these major zones have developed small and medium industrial cities, which tended
to become localised industrial systems33—which we shall call, in the rest of this article,
clusters, the English word used in Chinese—in more traditional sectors, such as construction,
plumbing, furniture and leather. The policy of developing the technology zones was very
different in nature from that of the industrial clusters.
The industrial cluster policy
31 The term specialised cluster (zhuanye zhen) is an administrative name which the authorities
give a locality in order to avail of specific support in the framework of subsidies
for technological development. This designation facilitates the establishment of centres
for innovation and technology development in sectors such as steel, furniture, textiles,
construction, etc. It is no longer a question of merely defining a specific zone to function as a
magnet for foreign investment, but of improving the technical and technological capacities of
local enterprises by the creation of this kind of structure. In contrast with the local production
systems in France or the industrial districts in Italy, the specialised product clusters are an
official designation which make it possible for municipalities to obtain subsidies from the
province.
32 In 2000, the Department of Science and Technology of Guangdong officially launched a
pilot project aimed at encouraging the development of scientific and technical innovation
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at district level and therefore to support growth of their economy. At that time, 78 districts
were chosen; some were even designated as models of technological innovation. In July 2002,
the province drew up a list of 38 localised innovation and technology centres in specialised
localities (see Table 8 for a partial list of specialised localities)34. Among the objectives of the
innovation centres, research activities, in liaison with the universities and public institutions,
are among the most important. However this denomination covers small technical bureaus as
well as real technology centres. Thus for example the locality of Suikou, in the municipality
of Kaiping (Jiangmen), which specialises in taps (or “faucets” as is the American word) and
plumbing, had no innovation centre, but the local government invested 1 million yuan in the
creation of an Internet B2B (business to business) service for the tap industry. This unit, which
became an independent enterprise in 2002, is probably exactly the kind of interface which the
locality needed35. In fact, of the 415 industrial groupings to be found in the Delta, a quarter
can be considered as "industrial clusters"36. They are destined to become the favoured sites
for innovation. A research programme carried out by the Institute for the Development of
Guangdong at the University of Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen) made it its main field of research37.
33 In Nanhai, nine technical innovation centres were set up within traditional industries such
as ceramics, textiles, clothing, aluminium products and foodstuffs. Furthermore, a large
number of enterprises sought to create in-house R&D units. In Pingzhou, we visited a shoe
manufacturing SME which employed 150 people; in a corner of the production workshop, a
young man and a young woman were designing shoes in a big drawing book, detailing entirely
by hand the shapes of the shoes to be cut out: this was the R&D unit.
34 In reality, most enterprises are short of funds, techniques and qualified personnel. According
to the Blue Report, the owners are peasants who have prospered but have no industrial
experience. Our observations are more complex, since in many specialised localities, the
bosses are former workers in production brigade and people's commune enterprises which
have become locality or district enterprises. While their technical knowledge is rudimentary,
they nevertheless have real competencies in their sector (for example in founding, mechanics,
electrolysis or galvanising).
35 The development of the municipality of Nanhai shows some particularities. The grouping
together of its enterprises took place long before the policy of formation and subsidy for
clusters. In Nanhai it was decided to "give the manufacturing sector its own path". Thus
each zhen (W, locality, an administrative unit smaller than a municipality) became a unit
of reference. The innovation centres structured them individually, in order to ensure the
promotion of computer and production techniques, and to spread commercial information. The
metal and mechanical industry in Jinsha brought together in Nanhai some 4,000 enterprises
which amounted to a production worth 10 billion yuan, 10% of national industry and 40%
of industry at provincial level38. Half the production was exported to Europe, Southeast Asia
and the Middle East. Today, Jinsha has 1,000 enterprises whose production exceeds 1 billion
yuan, of which 98% are family SMEs. They have no innovation capacity and the quality of
their production is low. An innovation centre was set up in September 1999. At the same time
collaboration was set up with the local Huazhong university to create an R&D enterprise and
other research structures. A development centre for new products was established including a
unit specialising in the design of steel moulds for extruding machines. This technology made it
possible to reduce the design time for new moulds from 30 to 7 days. Since its establishment,
this innovation centre has created over 100 new products.
36 8. List of Industrial Clusters in Guangdong Province
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37 Xiqiao and its cotton textiles industry is the perfect example of the success of this policy.
The locality had 1,670 textile enterprises for the printing and spinning of all kinds of fabrics,
for both furniture and clothing. The annual sales of this locality amounted to 13 billion yuan.
The sizes of the factories were so small and so varied, and the technical level so low, that the
enterprises could see no point in initiating R&D activities. In May 1999, the government set up
an innovation centre. Since then the centre has created over 8,000 products (computer assisted
textile designs). Every day the centre's personnel visit the enterprises. This is how Xiqiao is
moving from imitation to innovation. The centre also has clients in the provinces of Zhejiang
and Hunan, as well as in Taiwan. The initial investment was 7 million yuan, and the centre
quickly became self-sufficient by the sale of its services. Moreover, it participated in a major
effort to computerise the enterprises, ensuring the development and maintenance of the local
computer network. More recently, in 2004, the government of the province decided to set up
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a technical university specialising in textiles and to ensure that the locality of Xiqiao became
a centre for technology development at a national level.
38 The policy of industrial clusters and the network of innovation centres which are attached
to them make up the backbone of innovation policy in China, complementing the other
major facets which are the technology development zones, the support given to certain
enterprises, and the transformation of enterprises into public research centres39. The innovation
centres have very strong links with local enterprises, particularly since they are a means for
the computerisation of the enterprises, and because of their knowledge of local production
conditions. It is this adaptation to local conditions which explains the differences between
them. Each innovation centre adjusts to particular industrial structures and the nature of
the production sector obviously greatly influences their functioning. The dynamic industrial
clusters encourage these centres to become providers of product models. In the less dynamic
clusters, their role is much more difficult to define. Information is often a central preoccupation
but no previous experience of technology watch makes it possible for the centre employees to
sell information, which in most cases is limited to Internet pages, and at best, to B2B systems.
In reality the training and management needs of enterprises far exceed what these centres
can provide. The weakness of links with the universities and technical schools makes this
connection work even rarer and more difficult. Eventually, one of the functions of these centres
will be to play an intermediary role between research organisations and enterprises, if they can
manage to provide their own financing40.
Industrial space as the basis for regional innovation space
39 The authorities in the province of Guangdong have understood the importance of supporting
enterprises in their technological aspects. They have recently created a system of indicators
in order to follow technological developments more closely. It has also been decided no
longer to leave the initiative to local authorities alone, as they lack resources. Thus, in textiles,
the decision to transform a local technical centre into a real technological and industrial
development centre cannot depend on the local authority of the locality of Xiqiao. Finally,
the provincial government has begun thinking about the optimisation of the technical centres,
which, besides their technical functions, must contribute to the spreading of information and
to networking with the universities.
40 Moreover, many industrial zones are seeing the establishment of owner's associations either
on a sectoral or on a geographical basis. Local authorities seek to promote them in order to
have an interlocutor. For the moment it is not possible to tell whether these associations will
have any impact on the modernisation of enterprises.
41 We have concentrated on the industrial aspect alone, which represents the essential feature
of the economic development of the province, and of the Pearl River Delta. This region has
experienced what Gilles Guiheux calls the creation of a local economic space41, following
other researchers, geographers42, and economists43, who have shown the importance of the
local rooting of industry in China, or more generally, in several developing countries44.
42 But in order to succeed in transforming an industrial space into a regional innovation space it
is necessary to transcend local limits, particularly by creating stable links between suppliers
and clients, by facilitating access to technology resources, setting up a qualified labour market
and forging links with the universities. Guangdong has simultaneously to face threefold
competition as well as structural difficulties.
43 The competition comes partly from foreign companies, which take little account of the
technical centres and the growth of SMEs, and invest more and more in R&D in China45.
Foreign investors, from Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, Japan and the West, who are numerous
in Guangdong, make up a separate group of economic players who are very little integrated
into the local economy, and use the local space as if it were a mine, rich in cheap labour, even
when highly trained (a CAD technician hardly costs more than a worker), and in infrastructure
(the various incentives offered by local government to foreign investors). The competition
also comes from other Chinese industrial regions seeking to access the resources of the central
government. This competition is obvious at both local and provincial level. Lastly must be
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emphasised the particular competition of Beijing and Shanghai, cities which, because of their
political status, monopolise high level scientific resources and receive preferential support
to establish technology development centres. Their position reflects political choices which
are not necessarily based on economic rationality, as is shown by the multitude of urban
development plans which have benefited Shanghai, the pressures on multinationals to set
up there, or the measures in favour of establishing companies in Beijing. Oddly, provincial
political leaders never mention a threat from Asia. Only India is mentioned in the field of
software development parks as an example to be followed and overtaken. Malaysia (a strong
centre of techno-industrial development), Thailand and Singapore do not even rate a mention,
either as competitors or as markets. And so it is that the enterprises themselves seem to aim
more easily at Europe, the United States and America, central Asia and Africa, than at South
or Southeast Asia.
44 The structural problems are related both to the legacy of the former socialist economy and
to recent growth. The national private sector, which is particularly active in Guangdong, is
beginning to claim a representative position, an attitude which is sometimes corporatist but
very real, and which the state has to face for the first time in its history. The considerable power
of local governments is being called into question, and negotiations to establish priorities in
financing will not be easy. The lack of clear distinction between public and private, which
was an advantage for the creation of SMEs, becomes a difficulty when it comes to supporting
the technological upgrading of enterprises. Lastly the lack of confidence of enterprises vis-
à-vis the collective (not to say the public) where links of trust, which are essential for the
creation of enterprises, do not offer a configuration, constitute a further obstacle. For the
moment enterprises are above all consumers of infrastructure and there are only rare cases
where professional or industrial associations connect with local authorities.
45 Nobody can say today if enterprises and local authorities will succeed in setting up an
innovation system, but two aspects point in that direction. The provincial government's
thinking is particularly active and includes considerable observation on the ground. Far from
being a diktat, it is a carefully thought-out policy drawing on both foreign experiments46 and
on local reality. The government report we have used in these pages is evidence of this. This
initiates a process of discussion, for example on the very nature of innovation activities, the
role of the universities, the functioning of innovation centres, and the role of national and
foreign enterprises. Moreover, enterprises inserted in industrial clusters inevitably maintain a
symbiotic relationship with innovation centres, which counterbalance their shortcomings in
technology and their strong links with foreign customers. The bringing together of political
will, local resources, a dense industrial network and the fast learning of technology indicates
a favourable outcome.
46 Translated from the French original by Michael Black
Notes
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